Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Brent A. Ferrin v. Keith B. Romney, dba Keith B.
Romney & Associates: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Duane R. Smith; Craig G. Adamson; Dart, Adamson, & Donovan; Attorneys for Appellee.
David L. Blackner; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ferrin v. Romney, No. 930369 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5294

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

anmr

f

UTA '

DOC

r

KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

°imgL

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRENT A. FERRIN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Appeal No. 930369-CA

vs.
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
ASSOCIATES,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL
From the Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge

DUANE R. SMITH, No. 2996
CRAIG G. ADAMSON, No. 0024
DART, ADAMSON, & DONOVAN
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DAVID L. BLACKNER, No. 5376
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID
L. BLACKNER
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 1 1 1993

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRENT A. FERRIN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Appeal No. 930369-CA

vs.
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
ASSOCIATES,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL
From the Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge

DUANE R. SMITH, No. 2996
CRAIG G. ADAMSON, No. 0024
DART, ADAMSON, & DONOVAN
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DAVID L. BLACKNER, No. 5376
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID
L. BLACKNER
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings

4
6

Disposition at Trial Court

7

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.
The Trial Court Erred When it Excluded From Evidence
the Two Written Buy-Out Proposals and Such Error
Was Prejudicial to Romney
B.
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Taxed
as "Costs" the Witness Travel Expenses Submitted
by Ferrin

19

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT

20

I.

II.

14
14

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
ROMNEY'S EXHIBIT 57 AND ROMNEY'S EXHIBIT 58
INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE BOTH EXHIBITS ARE
CLEARLY RELEVANT TO THE CASE

20

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
ROMNEY'S EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 INTO EVIDENCE
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE ROMNEY WAS
PREJUDICED AS A RESULT

25

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN TAXING
COSTS AGAINST ROMNEY BECAUSE THE COURT TAXED AS
"COSTS" TRAVEL EXPENSES REQUESTED BY FERRIN WHICH
ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO BE TAXED AS COSTS UNDER UTAH
CASE LAW OR BY STATUTE

29

CONCLUSION

31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)

2

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980)

1, 2
....

2, 19, 29

Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 3, 19, 29-30
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993)

2, 14, 20
. .

2

State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
cert, den., 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)

2

State v. Villarreal. 1993 WL 286661 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 15, 26
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)

. 15, 26

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)

15, 26

State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

...

20

Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)

26

Utah R. Civ. P. 61

3, 26

Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2)

3, 28

Utah R. Evid. 401

3, 21

Utah R. Evid. 402

4, 21
Statutes

Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992)
Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992)

1
4, 19, 20, 29, 30

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRENT A. FERRIN,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]I

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

]

vs.

KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually ]
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
]
ASSOCIATES,
])
Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal No. 930369-CA

)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a final judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Utah Court

of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit into

evidence on relevance grounds two written buy-out proposals, each
referring to compensation, and whether such error was prejudicial.
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this
issue is a correctness standard.

-1-

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,

781, n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991)1
2.

Whether the trial court erred in assessing Ferrin's

claimed witness

travel

expenses as

"costs."

The applicable

standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is an abuse
of discretion standard.

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774

2

There is recent authority from the Utah Supreme Court
suggesting the appropriate standard of review for the admission or
exclusion of evidence is an abuse of discretion standard, not a
correctness standard. Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P. 2d 1260,
1262 (Utah 1993); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270, n. 11
(Utah 1993); Also see, State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), cert, den., 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). In Thurman,
supra, the Court disavows certain of the standard of review
language used in its earlier decision in State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d
774, 781, n. 3 (Utah 1991).
However, in so doing, the Court
observes that all standards of review involve questions of law, but
that a correctness standard is not to be applied in "reviewing each
such [admissibility] ruling,"
which suggests that some
admissibility rulings are still subject to a correctness standard
of review.
At first glance, the Nay case would appear to stand for the
proposition that the exclusion of evidence is subject to an abuse
of discretion standard.
However, the Nay case involved the
exclusion of evidence based on Utah R. Evid. 403, which by its
terms grants discretion to the trial court to determine whether
evidence already deemed relevant should nevertheless be excluded.
Here, the issue is whether the proffered evidence is relevant,
which Romney submits is uniquely a question of law. For that
reason, Romney believes that the Gonzalez case still states the
applicable standard of review for a ruling on whether evidence is
relevant (and therefore admissible). Nevertheless, Romney does njt
wish to overemphasize the point because it his contention that
whatever standard of review is applied, be it correctness or abuse
of discretion, it is clear that the trial court erred when it
determined that the subject buy-out proposals were not relevant.
-2-

(Utah 1980); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
-Utah R. Civ. P. 61 provides as follows:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court to
inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
-Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2) provides as follows:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
*

*

*

(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which the questions were
asked.
-Utah R. Evid. 401 provides as follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.

-3-

-Utah R. Evid. 402 provides as follows:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute,
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts
of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
-Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992) provides as follows:
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in
a civil case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents
per mile and is taxed for the distance actually and
necessarily traveled inside the state in going only.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves a dispute over compensation between an

employer, appellant Keith B. Romney

("Romney"), and a former

employee, appellee Brent A. Ferrin ("Ferrin"), regarding amounts
Ferrin

claims are owed

to him

pursuant

compensation agreement with Romney.

to

an

alleged oral

Romney is the sole owner of

Keith Romney Associates ("KRA"), a resort condominium and timeshare
consulting firm.

Ferrin was employed by KRA from August, 1986

through May, 1990, when Ferrin voluntarily quit his employment at
KRA in order to take a position with the Marriott Corporation.
Ferrin brought this action because he contends that he har an
oral compensation agreement with Romney which provides that he is
entitled to a percentage share of all income earned by KRA while
-4-

Ferrin was employed at KRA, and that such percentage share is to
be paid to him when the income is received by KRA, whether Ferrin
is still employed at KRA or not.

After Ferrin left KRA, KRA

received certain income which Ferrin contends was earned by KRA
before he left and that therefore he is entitled to a share of such
income.

Ferrin also contends that he is entitled to a percentage

share of any income which may be received in the future by KRA if
it was earned by KRA before he left.
As his defense, Romney denies that he ever had such an
agreement with Ferrin.

Rather, Romney contends that the express

oral compensation agreement of the parties is that Ferrin was
entitled to a 25% share of all gross revenues actually received by
KRA during the time Ferrin was employed at KRA, with certain
exceptions, less certain expenses. However, once Ferrin left KRA,
Ferrin's entitlement to any compensation from KRA ended.

Romney

further contends that there was no meeting of the minds of the
parties or manifestation of mutual assent to the oral agreement
which Ferrin claims exists, and that nothing Romney either said or
did could have led Ferrin to believe that such an agreement
existed.

Moreover, Romney contends that the income KRA received

after Ferrin quit was not earned by KRA before he left, so Ferrin
would not be entitled to receive a share of such KRA income in any
event.
-5-

In addition, Romney asserted three counterclaims against
Ferrin, each arising out of breaches of the duty of loyalty and/or
the fiduciary duty Romney contends Ferrin owed to him as Ferrin's
employer:

(1) while Ferrin was employed at KRA and at KRA expense,

and against Romneyfs specific instructions after he first learned
of Ferrin's actions, Ferrin secretly attempted to sell to KRA
clients and prospective KRA clients a deficient computer software
program he had helped to develop;

(2) While Ferrin was employed

at KRA and at KRA expense, Ferrin secretly attempted to induce a
KRA client to breach its contract with KRA and to enter into a
separate consulting agreement with Ferrin; and (3) While Ferrin was
employed at KRA and at KRA expense, Ferrin secretly negotiated his
own employment with the Marriott Corporation at the same time
Romney had asked Ferrin to negotiate a consulting contract with
Marriott on behalf of KRA.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The case was tried to a jury commencing on January 25, 1993
and continued through January 28, 1993.

On cross examination of

Ferrin, the trial court refused to allow into evidence two written
buy-out proposals for KRA, which Romney's counsel proffered to the
court were either authored by Ferrin or were prepared with Ferrin's
input, and had been given to Romney by Ferrin while Ferrin was
still employed at KRA.

Each proposal directly referred to the
-6-

issue of compensation. One of the proposals, Romneyfs Exhibit 58,
set forth precisely what Romney contends was the true understanding
between Romney and Ferrin regarding Ferrin's compensation, which
was that if Ferrin's employment terminated, Ferrin's entitlement
to compensation from KRA would end.
The other written buy-out proposal, Romney's Exhibit 57,
provided what would happen to Romney's compensation in the event
Romney was either terminated or quit KRA after Ferrin had completed
his proposed purchase of KRA.

In that proposal, Ferrin had

carefully provided that Romney!s entitlement to compensation would
end at termination of employment.

Romney contends this also

evidences the true understanding of the parties that Ferrin's
entitlement to compensation from KRA would also end at termination
of employment.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court
The

trial

court

dismissed

Romney's

second

and

third

counterclaims at the close of Romney's case and only allowed
Romney's first counterclaim to go to the jury.

Pursuant

to

a

special verdict form, the jury found that Ferrin was entitled to
a share of the monies received by KRA after Ferrin quit in the
amount of $102,681.42.

The jury further found that Ferrin is

entitled to a 20% share of income received, if any, by KRA in the
future relating to certain KRA contracts.
-7-

On Romney!s first

counterclaim, the jury found that Ferrin had breached his duty of
loyalty to Romney, but found that Romney had not been damaged
thereby.
After the jury's verdict, but before the entry of judgment,
Romney objected to certain witness travel expenses Ferrin sought
to have reimbursed as "costs" in the case, including airfare,
meals, taxi, lodging, etc.

The trial court assessed the costs

against Romney as requested by Ferrin.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. Defendant and appellant Keith B. Romney ("Romney") is the
sole proprietor of Keith Romney Associates ("KRA"), a condominium
development and timeshare consulting firm based in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 167-168; Record, p. 2 ) .
2. KRA provides consulting services to developers and others

on all aspects of condominium development, including the marketing
of the project, sales staff organization, tax consequences, legal
documentation, maintenance fees, financing, etc. (Transcript, Day
1, pp. 93-94).
3.

Plaintiff and appellee Brent A. Ferrin ("Ferrin") was

employed by KRA from August, 1986 through approximately May 1,
1990, when Ferrin voluntarily quit his job at KRA in order to take
a position with the Marriott Corporation.

(Record, pp. 3-4;

Transcript, Day 1, pp. 87, 94, 107-108; Transcript, Day 3, pp. 6466, 70-71, 100-103).
4.

Ferrin, who had a background in condominium sales and

marketing, was hired by Romney specifically to assist in business
cultivation for KRA, as well as to assist Romney in the servicing
of KRA clients.

(Transcript, Day 1, pp. 88-90, 94-95; Transcript,

Day 3, pp. 24-26).
5.

At trial, Ferrin testified that with regard to his

compensation at KRA, instead of being paid a salary, he had an oral
agreement with Romney which provided he would initially receive 50%
of "all the funds" that came into KRA.

(Transcript, Day 1, pp.

100-102).
6.

Ferrin testified further that such percentage share was

later reduced to 30%, then eventually to 25%, where it stood at the
time he left KRA.
7.

(Transcript, Day 1, pp. 102-103, 164).

Romney testified that, prior to Ferrinfs joining KRA, he

met with Ferrin on August 7, 1986 and agreed orally to pay him 50%
of "new receipts," which Romney testified meant "new business that
would come in after [Ferrin] came on board, new receipts of that."
(Transcript, Day 3, p. 21).
8. As Ferrin had testified, Romney also stated that Ferrinfs
percentage share was later to be reduced.
testified:
-9-

Specifically, Romney

The agreement was that less certain business cultivation
expenses, that [Ferrin] would be paid a percentage of the new
receipts on new business that came in, exclusive of existing
business, and that this would continue, as indicated, until
the end of the year, and at that time we would then make a
determination of what it would be from then on. (Transcript,
Day 3, p.22) .
9.

With respect to Ferrin!s entitlement to compensation from

KRA after termination of employment, Romney testified "I told him
[during the August 7, 1986 meeting] that I would pay [Ferrin] as
long as he was at KRA.
left KRA."

I told him that I would pay him until he

(Transcript, Day 3, p. 23).

10. Ferrin, on the other hand, without testifying that Romney
ever actually told him that he would continue to pay him after he
quit KRA, testified that "our agreement was that I was entitled to
the money when KRA was entitled to it, and I was paid the money
when KRA received the money.
I didn't get my share."

And so until it was received, then

(Transcript, Day 1, p. 104; also see,

Transcript, Day 1, pp. 100-104, 109-113, 164; Transcript, Day 2,
pp. 52-54; Ferrinfs Exhibit 10; in addition, see Record, pp. 408437 for how Ferrin contends Romney!s "agreement" to pay Ferrin
after he quit could have come into being).
11.

With regard to what happens to Ferrin*s entitlement to

compensation

if Ferrin

left KRA, Ferrin1s

counsel summarized

Ferrin's contention as follows: "[a]nd the fact that Mr. Ferrin was
no longer with him

[KRA] meant nothing, because they'd [KRA]
-10-

already earned it . • . It was just a matter of waiting until it
[the KRA revenue allegedly earned before Ferrin quit] showed up .
. ."

(Transcript, Day 1, p.73).

12.

And

in

closing

argument,

summarized the "deal" as being:

Ferrin*s

counsel

again

"You know, it's sort of like you

work to the end of the month, but if you're not there on the 5th
when the check comes out, you don't get it.
same situation we have here.
it."

That's exactly the

[Ferrin] earned it, he's entitled to

(Transcript, Day 4, pp. 22-23).
13.

On that fundamental issue, entitlement to compensation

after termination of employment, Romney attempted to offer into
evidence during the cross examination of Ferrin two unsigned
written buy-out proposals for KRA Ferrin had given to Romney, each
of which spoke to the precise issue of Ferrin's entitlement to
compensation from KRA after termination of employment, the subject
matter of the lawsuit.

(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 57-59, 82-89, 103-

104; Romney's Exhibits 57 and 58).2
14.

The first of these written buy-out proposals, a document

in Ferrinfs handwriting dated February 18, 1989, and marked as
Romney's Exhibit 57, contains a paragraph referencing what Ferrin

2

The pages of the trial transcript where these documents were
identified, offered, and rejected are attached hereto as Attachment
"A."
-11-

proposed would happen to Romney's compensation after Ferrin had
purchased KRA.

In paragraph 7, Ferrin provided:

[Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA
net of BC expenses.
Plus he will receive incentive
bonuses based on exceptional performance.
If KBR
fRomney 1 leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above
mentioned 20% payments shall cease. (Romney1s Exhibit
5 7, Emphas i s added). 3
15.

The second written buy-out proposal, marked as Romney's

Exhibit 58, and dated February, 1990, just a few months prior to
the date Ferrin announced his departure from KRA, had attached to
it an unsigned "Purchase Option and Employment Agreement."

The

directly relevant portion of that document reads:
[Romney] and [Ferrin] agree to
Employment Agreement of [Ferrin]:

the

following

re:

1.
Until TFerrin] purchases KRA or is terminated,
[Romney] agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to
twenty-five percent (25%) of all income received by KRA
less any unreimbursed business cultivation expenses (the
same method of determination used to date).
(Romney's
Exhibit 58, emphasis added). 4
16.

Earlier in the case, the trial court had been provided

copies of and had reviewed both of these documents in connection

3

A copy of Romney f s Exhibit 57 is attached hereto as
Attachment "B." Romney's Exhibit 57 is identical to F e r n f s
Exhibit 3, which Romney ! s counsel, as reflected in the transcri :,
actually offered into evidence when the trial court pointed
it
that the document had already been marked.
4

A copy of
Attachment "C."

Romney f s

Exhibit
-12-

58

is

attached

hereto

as

with a summary judgment motion filed by Romney. (Transcript of All
Pretrial Hearings, Hearing on Motion For Summary Judgment; Record,
pp. 304-403, 408-437, 438-464).
17.

At trial, the court decided to reserve a ruling on

Romney!s Exhibit 57 (Ferrinfs Exhibit 3) when it was first offered,
(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 57-59),

and then after hearing the

arguments of counsel, decided not to rule on the admissibility of
the document but to proceed instead on a "question by answer basis"
with respect to that exhibit.

(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 82-84).

18. With respect to Romney's Exhibit 58, after argument, the
court lfperceive[d] [it] to be irrelevant" and decided not "to allow
its use as an exhibit at this point, absent further showing of
relevancy," but did indicate that counsel could ask Ferrin about
"whether his understanding of compensation was consistent with
[Romney1s Exhibit 58] . . . "
19.

(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 84-89).

Later, when counsel attempted to pursue a line of

questioning with Ferrin on a "question by answer basis" on Romneyfs
Exhibit 57, counsel was stopped by the court, who ruled at that
time the document was "irrelevant."

(Transcript, Day 2, pp. 103-

104).
20.

Counsel then handed Romney1s Exhibit 58 to Ferrin in

order to question Ferrin about his understanding of the document
but was again stopped by the court, who indicated that her ruling
-13-

on relevancy applied to Romney's Exhibit 58 as well, and thus
neither document was admitted into evidence.

(Transcript, Day 2,

pp. 104-105).
21.

After the jury rendered its verdict as described above,

Ferrin sought to have $1,142.95

in witness

assessed as "costs" in the case.

"travel expenses"

(Record, pp. 708-709).

The

objectionable travel expenses requested included $591.88 airfare
for witness Jim Vernes, $77.50 lodging for Mr. Vernes, $26.00 taxi
fare for Mr. Vernes, $248.00 transportation for witness Bruce
Maclntire,

and

$150.57

in

"food11

presumably just the witnesses.
22.

for

unspecified

persons,

(Record, pp. 716-719).

Romney filed a motion to have costs taxed by the Court

in accordance with the law, (Record, pp. 710-715), and responded
further by letter, (Record, p. 727), but the Court assessed the
"costs" as requested by Ferrin.

(Record, pp. 725-726, 728-732).5

5

Attached hereto as Attachment "D" are copies of all < f the
relevant portions of the Record on this issue, which in lucre
Ferrin's original memorandum of costs, Romney's motion to have
costs taxed by the Court, Ferrin!s amended memorandum of coses, a
letter from Romney's counsel to the trial court, and a minute
entry.
-14-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court Erred When it Excluded From Evidence
the Two Written Buy-Out Proposals and Such Error
Was Prejudicial to Romney
The trial court erred when it ruled that Romneyfs Exhibits 57

and 58 were not relevant to the case and therefore not admissible,
and such error was harmful and prejudicial to Romney.

Whether

evidence is "relevant/1 and therefore admissible, is a question of
law,

subject

to

review

for

correctness

on appeal.

Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 6

State v.

A document is

"relevant" if it has " . . . any tendency to make the existence of
any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Utah R. Evid. 401.

If a document is relevant, it is admissible.

Utah R. Evid. 402.
Nevertheless, a trial court's error in excluding evidence does
not result

in reversible error unless the error

is "harmful."

State v. Villarreal, 1993 WL 286661 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

"An

error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently

high

as

to

confidence in the verdict."
789, 796 (Utah 1991).

undermine

[the

appellate

court's]

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d

There must be a "reasonable likelihood that

6

See footnote 1, supra, under the Statement of Issues section
for a discussion on the applicable standard of review.
-15-

the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."

State v.

Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
Both documents were clearly relevant to Romney's case.

In

Romney!s Exhibit 58, dated February, 1990, there is a section of
the exhibit which states what the agreement of the parties had been
"to date" with respect to compensation, the most basic "fact of
consequence" in the case.

Under the heading "Purchase Option and

Employment Agreement," the following language appears:
1.
Until rFerrin] purchases KRA or is terminated,
[Romney] agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to
twenty-five percent (25%) of all income received by KRA
less any unreimbursed business cultivation expenses (the
same method of determination used to date). (Romney's
Exhibit 58, emphasis added).
Romney

contends that

language

is a statement

by Ferrin

indicating what his understanding of the agreement had been "to
date," and such understanding was different from Ferrin1s position
at trial and consistent with Romney1s position at trial.

Romney

proffered to the court that this document was prepared by Ferrin!s
attorney, with Ferrin's input, and surely Ferrin!s attorney did not
know what the agreement had been "to date" unless Ferrin had told
him. Admission of this document would have made it "more probable"
that the jury would have concluded the facts related by Romney
regarding compensation were true, and "less probable" that the jury
would have concluded the facts related by Ferrin were true because
the document plainly supports Romneyfs testimony.
-16-

As for Romney's Exhibit 57, entitled "KRA Buyout Outline,"
dated February 18, 1989, and in Ferrin's own handwriting, the key
portion of that document provides:
7)

[Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA
net of [business cultivation] expenses. Plus he will
receive bonuses based on exceptional performance. If
rRomney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above
mentioned 20% payments shall cease.
(Exhibit 3,
paragraph 7, emphasis added).

While this language deals with the issue of what would have
happened to Romney's compensation if Ferrin had purchased KRA and
Romney had thereafter decided to quit or was fired, the effect of
this exhibit on Ferrin's case would have been devastating because
the language contradicts Ferrin's assertion at trial that as long
as any income received by KRA after he left was earned by KRA
before he quit, he was "entitled" to his percentage share of it.
Romney's Exhibit 57, in Ferrin's handwriting, is completely
inconsistent with that position. What makes it so powerful is that
Ferrin himself was careful to provide that if Romney were to quit
KRA voluntarily after Ferrin purchased it, Romney!s entitlement to
compensation would end. What Ferrin says Romney essentially agreed
to orally, Ferrin was unwilling to agree to if the roles were
reversed and Ferrin were Romney's employer . . .
Admission of this document would have made it "more probable"
that the jury would have concluded the facts related by Romney
-17-

concerning Ferrin's entitlement to compensation after termination
from KRA were true, and "less probable" that the jury would have
concluded the facts related by Ferrin on that "fact of consequence"
were true.
Both of these documents would have served as evidence in
Romney1s direct examination, because he would have been able to
present more persuasive evidence on the fundamental
consequence

to

the

determination

of

the

action,"

"fact of
i.e., the

existence of the "agreement" alleged by Ferrin, and it also would
have had a devastating effect on cross examination of Ferrin since
both documents were so at odds with what Ferrin testified to at
trial.

Thus, the trial court erred in finding Romney's Exhibits

57 and 58 were not relevant to the case.
The trial court's determination that these documents were not
relevant was harmful to Romney and affected the outcome of the
proceedings.

Ferrin alleged an oral agreement existed.

Oral

agreements are elusive of proof, and thus any evidence tending to
either confirm or deny the existence of the agreement was vitally
important to the case.
Even more importantly, Ferrin did not testify that Romney ever
actually told Ferrin that he would continue to pay him a share of
KRA revenue if Ferrin were to quit KRA. Rather, Ferrin1s assertion
was, and the jury presumably rendered their verdict based thereon,
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that Romneyfs "agreement" to that proposition could "be inferred
from the conduct of the parties, their statements, and dealings
together."
Where the existence of the alleged oral agreement was not
based upon the actual verbal agreement of Romney, but instead was
based upon "the totality of the circumstances," there can be no
doubt that it was reversible error to deny Romney the opportunity
to present his own evidence on "the totality of the circumstances,"
and "the conduct of the parties, their statements, and dealings
together."

The two-buy out proposals were unquestionably part of

"the totality of the circumstances" between the parties. Moreover,
each proposal spoke directly to the issue of entitlement to
compensation after termination of employment, the most crucial
issue of the lawsuit. The exclusion of these two documents creates
a "reasonable likelihood" that the trial courtfs error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.

Consequently, it is clear that this

Court's confidence in the verdict should be undermined.

B.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Taxed
as "Costs" the Witness Travel Expenses Submitted by Ferrin
The trial court abused its discretion in taxing as "costs"

the witness travel expenses claimed by Ferrin in his amended
memorandum of costs.

A trial court "can exercise reasonable

discretion in regard to the allowance of costs," but still "has a
-19-

duty to guard against any excesses or abuses
thereof."

in the taxing

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 1980).

"Costs" are "those fees which are required to be paid to the
court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be
included in the judgment."

Frampton, supra, at p. 774; Morgan v.

Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In Utah, the

statutes authorize fees of 25 cents per mile "traveled inside the
state in going only" for witnesses travelling from outside the
state.

Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992).

In his amended memorandum of costs, Ferrin claimed $1,142.95
of "costs" for the "travel expenses" of two out of state witnesses.
The

requested

travel

expenses

included

lodging, taxi, transportation, and food.

entries

for airfare,

None of the travel

expenses claimed are authorized by Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2).

In

fact, some of the same types of travel expenses were rejected as
"costs" by the Utah Court of Appeals in Morgan, supra, at p. 687.
In that case, the court refused, for example, to allow as "costs"
a

"business meal" and

"local travel" because they were "not

provided for by statute."

That eliminates the "food" and "taxi"

portions of Ferrin's request.
Still, limited taxing of travel expenses, at the rate of 25
cents per mile "traveled inside the state in going only," is
authorized by Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2). However, the statute does
-20-

not

authorize

"airfare/1

"lodging,I!

or

unspecified

"transportation." Consequently, the balance of Ferrin's requested
travel expenses cannot be taxed as costs either since they are not
authorized by statute.

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
ROMNEY'S EXHIBIT 57 AND ROMNEY'S EXHIBIT 58
INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE BOTH EXHIBITS ARE
CLEARLY RELEVANT TO THE CASE
The trial court erred in refusing to admit Romneyfs Exhibit
57 and Romney's Exhibit 58 into evidence because both documents are
clearly relevant to the case.

Whether evidence is "relevant," and

therefore admissible, is a question of law, subject to review for
correctness on appeal. State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 704 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).7

A document is "relevant" if it has ". . . any

tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."
is relevant, it is admissible.

Utah R. Evid. 401. If a document
Utah R. Evid. 402.

7

See footnote 1, supra, under the Statement of Issues section
for a discussion on the applicable standard of review.
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Both documents were relevant to Romney's defense of the case,
and were also crucial for his cross examination of Ferrin, because
each of the documents dealt with the key issue of what happens to
compensation after termination of employment from KRA, the most
basic issue of the entire lawsuit.

Both documents were relevant

because they had at least a "tendency" to make the version of the
oral compensation agreement asserted by Romney "more probable" and
the version of the agreement asserted by Ferrin to be "less
probable."
The central "fact of consequence to the determination of the
action" which the jury was called upon to decide in this case was
the question: Did Romney, either expressly, by implication, or by
conduct, ever agree to continue to pay Ferrin a percentage share
of KRA revenue even if Ferrin were to quit KRA. Of all the issues
the

jury

was

expected

to

decide, no

issue

was

"consequence to the determination of the action."

of

greater

All other

issues, such as whether any portion cf the income received by KRA
after Ferrin quit was earned by KRA before Ferrin left, about which
an inordinate amount of confusing testimony was offered at

rial,

paled in comparison to, and were subordinate to, that key 1 ^ue.
In the case of Romney!s Exhibit 58, dated February, j ^0,
which is just a few months prior to the date Ferrin announced lis
departure from KRA, there is a section of the exhibit wh-ch
-22-

actually states what the agreement of the parties was with regards
to compensation.

Under the title "Purchase Option and Employment

Agreement," the following crucial language appears:
[Romney] and [Ferrin] agree to the following re: Employment
Agreement of [Ferrin]:
1. Until TFerrin] purchases KRA or is terminated, [Romney]
agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to twenty-five percent
(25%) of all income received by KRA less any unreimbursed
business
cultivation
expenses
(the
same method
of
determination used to date). (Romney's Exhibit 58, emphasis
added).
That section is completely consistent with Romneyfs position at
trial, but directly contrary to the trial testimony of Ferrin.
Counsel proffered
prepared

by

to the court that Romneyfs Exhibit 58 was

Ferrin's

attorney with

Ferrin's

input, and was

presented to Romney by Ferrin in a failed attempt to purchase KRA.
It was a statement by Ferrin indicating what his understanding of
the agreement had been "to date," and such understanding was
different from Ferrin's position at trial. Whether Ferrin actually
ever signed the document or not, it contained his representation
of what the agreement had been "to date."

Had Romney's counsel

been allowed to do so, he would have questioned Ferrin in detail
regarding

the

origin

of

the

document

and

particularly

the

parenthetical representation in the document of what the agreement
had been "to date." Surely Ferrin's attorney did not know what the
agreement had been "to date" unless Ferrin had told him so.
-23-

It would have been devastating to Ferrin at trial had the
document been admitted and had counsel been allowed to cross
examine Ferrin fully concerning it.

Admission of this document

would have both made it "more probable" that the jury would have
concluded

the

facts

related

by

Romney

concerning

Ferrin's

entitlement to compensation after termination from KRA were true,
and "less probable" that the jury would have concluded the facts
related by Ferrin on that issue were true because the document
plainly supports Romney's testimony.

Romney's Exhibit 58 was

therefore relevant and should have been admitted as evidence at
trial.
The same is true of Romney!s Exhibit 57.

This document,

entitled "KRA Buyout Outline," and dated February 18, 1989, is in
Ferrin1s own handwriting.

The key portion of this document

provides as follows:
7)

[Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA
net of [business cultivation] expenses. Plus he will
receive bonuses based on exceptional performance. If
rRomney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above
mentioned 20% payments shall cease.
(Exhibit 3,
paragraph 7, emphasis added).

While this language deals with the issue of what woul. have
happened to Romneyf s compensation if Ferrin had purchased KF

and

Romney had thereafter decided to quit or was fired, the effect of
this exhibit on Ferrin1s case would have been equally devastating.
-24-

It would have been devastating because the foregoing language
contradicts Ferrin's assertion at trial that it did not matter for
purposes of compensation, under his alleged oral agreement with
Romney, if he still worked at KRA, as long as any income received
by KRA after he left was earned by KRA before he quit.

If the

income received by KRA was earned before he quit, regardless of
when it was actually received by KRA, he was "entitled" to his
percentage share of it, or so Ferrin argued to the jury.

(See

Statement of Facts, paragraphs 10-12).
Romneyfs

Exhibit

57,

in

Ferrin's

own

completely inconsistent with that position.

handwriting,

is

Ferrin himself was

careful to provide that if Romney were to quit KRA voluntarily, or
even

if

Romney

were

to

be

fired,

Romney's

compensation would cease at that point.

entitlement

to

In other words, what

Ferrin says Romney essentially agreed to orally when Romney agreed
to pay Ferrin on a percentage basis, Ferrin himself was absolutely
unwilling to agree to if the roles were reversed and Ferrin were
Romney1s employer . . .
Admission of this document would have both made it "more
probable" that the jury would have concluded the facts related by
Romney

concerning

Ferrinfs

entitlement

to

compensation

after

termination from KRA were true, and "less probable" that the jury
would have concluded the facts related by Ferrin on that "fact of
-25-

consequence

to

the

determination

of

the

action,! were true.

Consequently, Romney's Exhibit 57 was also plainly relevant to the
case.
Admission of these two documents

1) would have damaged

Ferrin's credibility in the eyes of the jury given his contrary
testimony at trial, 2) would have served as evidence in Romney!s
direct examination as Romney would have been able to fully explain
the facts and

circumstances surrounding

these provisions and

therefore would have better been able to present evidence on the
fundamental

"fact of consequence to the determination of the

action," and 3) would have had a devastating effect on cross
examination of Ferrin since both documents were so fundamentally
at odds with what Ferrin was espousing at trial. For the foregoing
reasons, Romney contends the trial court erred in finding Romney1s
Exhibits 57 and 58 were not relevant to the case.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
ROMNEY'S EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 INTO EVIDENCE
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE ROMNEY
WAS PREJUDICED AS A RESULT
The trial court's error in excluding Romney1s Exhibits 57 and
58

from being

admitted

into

evidence

therefore constitutes reversible error.

prejudiced

Romney

and

A trial court's error in

excluding evidence does not result in reversible error unless the
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error is "harmful." State v. Villarreal, 1993 WL 286661 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993); also, see, Utah R. Civ. P. 61 and Utah R. Evid. 103(a).
"An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome
is sufficiently high as to undermine

[the appellate court's]

confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789, 796 (Utah 1991). Put another way, there must be a "reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
Without question, the trial court's erroneous determination
that these two documents were not relevant to the case was harmful
to Romney and affected the outcome of the proceedings.
first place, Ferrin alleged an oral agreement existed.

In the
Oral

agreements are by their nature elusive of proof, and thus any
documentary

evidence

tending

to either

confirm

or

deny the

existence of the alleged agreement was vitally important to the
case.

In fact, of all the documents admitted at trial, only one

document even arguably spoke to the issue of whether Ferrin would
still be entitled to be paid after quitting KRA, and that was
Ferrinfs Exhibit 10.

Yet even that document, Ferrin admitted,

"doesn't say those exact words." (Transcript, Day 2, p. 54). That
is because the document was allegedly signed by Romney at a time
when Ferrin was still working at KRA and when Romney had no idea
that Ferrin was contemplating leaving. (Transcript, Day 2, pp. 52-27-

54).

These two documents, on the other hand, either authored by

Ferrin himself or by his attorney with Ferrin!s input, did "say
those exact words."
Even more importantly, with respect to the particular oral
agreement alleged by Ferrin, Ferrin could not, and therefore did
not, testify that Romney ever actually told Ferrin that he would
continue to pay him a share of KRA revenue if Ferrin were to quit
KRA.

Rather, Ferrin1s assertion was, and the jury presumably

rendered their verdict based thereon, that Romney's "agreement" to
that proposition could

"be inferred

from the conduct of the

parties, their statements, and dealings together."

(Instruction

No. 16, Record, p. 679; also see, Ferrin!s memorandum in opposition
to Romneyfs motion for summary judgment for a more complete
explanation of Ferrin1s contentions in this regard. Record, pp.
408-437).
Where the existence of the alleged oral agreement was not
based upon the actual verbal agreement of Romney, but instead was
based upon "the totality of the circumstances," there can be no
doubt that it was reversible error to deny Romney the opportunity
to present his own evidence on "the totality of the circumstances,"
and "the conduct of the parties, their statements, and dealings
together."

The two-buy out proposals were unquestionably part of

"the totality of the circumstances" between the parties. Moreover,
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each proposal spoke directly to the issue of entitlement to
compensation after termination of employment, the most crucial
issue of the lawsuit.

When the jury retired to the jury room to

commence their deliberations, they should have had these two
excluded exhibits available to them, and the testimony of the
witnesses regarding them well in mind, so that they could afford
them the weight they deemed appropriate. The jury should have been
allowed to know that these two documents were also part of "the
totality of the circumstances11 they were called upon to consider
in the case.

The exclusion of these two documents creates a

"reasonable likelihood" that the trial court's error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.
The trial court usurped the role of the jury by deeming these
documents to be not relevant.

The issues that could be raised

with respect to them, such as they were not signed, or the buyouts
contemplated thereby were never accomplished, go to the weight of
the evidence, not their admissibility.

As a result of the courtfs

erroneous ruling, the jury simply did not have all of the relevant
facts available to them to make a correct decision. Consequently,
it is clear that this Court's confidence in the verdict should be
undermined because of the reasonable likelihood that the trial
court's error affected the outcome of this case.
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Accordingly,

Romney respectfully requests that the Court reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial,
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN TAXING
COSTS AGAINST ROMNEY BECAUSE THE COURT TAXED
AS "COSTS" TRAVEL EXPENSES REQUESTED BY FERRIN
WHICH ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO BE TAXED AS COSTS
UNDER UTAH CASE LAW OR BY STATUTE
The trial court abused its discretion in taxing as "costs"
the witness travel expenses claimed by Ferrin in his amended
memorandum of costs.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) allows "costs . .

. as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs."

A trial court "can exercise reasonable discretion in

regard to the allowance of costs," but still "has a duty to guard
against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof."

Frampton

v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 1980).
"Costs" are defined as "those fees which are required to be
paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment."

Frampton, supra, at p.

774; Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In

Utah, the statutes authorize the following witness travel expenses
to be to be taxed as costs for witnesses travelling from outside
the state:
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in a civil
case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents per mile and
is taxed for the distance actually and necessarily traveled
-30-

inside the state in going only.
(1992).

Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2)

In his amended memorandum of costs, Ferrin claimed $1,142.95
of "costs" for the "travel expenses" of two out of state witnesses,
Jim Vernes and Bruce Maclntire.

The requested travel expenses

included the following:
Airfare:
Lodging:
Taxi:
Transportation:
Food:

$591.88
SLC
$ 77.50
$ 26.00
$248.00
$150.57

(Jim Vernes Vancouver BC return)
(Jim Vernes)
(Jim Vernes)
(Bruce Maclntire)

Total:

$1,142.95

None of the foregoing "travel expenses" claimed for these two
witnesses are authorized by Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2).

Ferrin may

have actually agreed to pay these amounts for Mr. Vernes and Mr.
Maclntire, but they are not taxable as costs under Utah law.
Romney raises no issue with respect to the other costs claimed by
Ferrin in his amended memorandum of costs, which included a $125
filing fee, a $4.50 service of process fee, and $501.40 for the
taking of Romney!s deposition.
Some of the same types of travel expenses claimed by Ferrin
were rejected as "costs" by the Utah Court of Appeals in Morgan,
supra, at p. 687.

In that case, the court refused to allow as

"costs," among other requested items, a "business meal" and "local
travel" because they "are not provided for by statute."
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That

eliminates the "food" and "taxi" portions of Ferrin's request.
Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) does permit the limited taxing of travel
expenses, but at the rate of 25 cents per mile "traveled inside the
state in going only."

It does not, however, authorize "airfare,"

"lodging," or unspecified "transportation."

Accordingly, the

balance of Ferrin1s requested travel expenses are not taxable as
costs either since they are not authorized by statute.

For the

foregoing reasons, Romney respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the decision of the trial court taxing Ferrin*s witness
travel expenses as "costs" in the case.
CONCLUSION
Because both Romney's Exhibit 57 and 58 had a "tendency to
make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence," the trial court erred in finding
the two documents irrelevant.

Moreover, the trial courtfs error

in excluding the evidence was harmful and prejudicial to Romney
since there is "a reasonable likelihood the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings."

Finally, the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding Ferrin1s witness travel expenses as "costs"
because the "travel expenses" claimed by Ferrin are not authorized
to be taxed as costs by statute or under current Utah case law.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Romney respectfully requests that
-32-

the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this
case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / * day of August, 1993.

yk^WY'. fT)j2-*L^
David L. Blackner
Attorney for Appellant
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Exhibit "A"

57

A

Right.

Q

So KRA is eligible to receive its fee beginning

June 1, 1990; isn't that right?
MR. SMITH:

This is, again, argument.

admitted that's what the words are.
THE COURT:

He has

They're very clear.

The document has been admitted, the

document speaks for itself, and the question has been
asked and answered.

The objection is sustained.

Let's

move along.
Q

(BY MR. BLACKNER)

Okay, Mr. Ferrin.

You

testified yesterday that the reason you left KRA is
because you couldn't work out a deal with Mr. Romney on
the purchase of KRA; is that right?
A

I couldn't work out one acceptable to him.

Q

So you had been negotiating, or attempting to

negotiate one, anyway; isn't that right?
A

For several years.

Q

And in connection with some of those, or in

connection with those efforts, you had committed some of
your ideas to writing; isn't that right?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, the first proposal that you wrote to Mr.

Romney was prepared in February of 1989.

Do you recall

doing that?
A

I don't remember the exact date.

Dtf

MR. BLACKNER:

Counsel, this is, again, this is

something that's been identified in both sets of exhibits.
It's your book number 3, tab number 3, it's ours tab
number 6.
THE COURT:

Is this Exhibit Number 3?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, it is.

Well, I need to see it,

1

but I assume .It is.
MR. BLACKNER:
THE COURT:
have any relevance?

This is trial Exhibit 51, b u t —

What other exhibits, counsel, that

J

What exhibit number is this?

MR. SMITH:

This is number 3.

MR. BLACKNER:

It's number 51.

It's already been marked as number

MR. SMITH:
3.

MR. BLACKNER:

It's already been entered, I'm

sorry•
MR. SMITH:

It's been marked.

THE COURT:

It has not been received.

Is this

proposed Exhibit 3?
MR. SMITH:

That is correct.

THE COURT:

And are you asking to have it

admitted at this time ?

1

MR. BLACKNER:

Yes, I am.

THE COURT:

Any objection to 3 being admitt* ?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, I do, Your Honor, on the ba
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that it has entirely no relevance to any issue before the
court here.

This is negotiations for a buyout, it doesn't

speak to compensation.

If they remain employed, it

doesn't speak to any issue here.

It doesn't even speak to

the counterclaims.
THE COURT:
this time.

All right, I'm not admitting it at

You may proceed with your line of questioning,

we'll see where we end up.
MR. BLACKNER:

Your Honor, can I present a

counterargument with respect to what Mr. Smith has said?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BLACKNER:

Okay.

doesn't speak to compensation.
THE COURT:

He's represented that it
And if you'll look—

Just a moment, either we're at the

side bar or we're not, and if we are then we're going to
allow also counsel to be present.

Please approach, both

of you.
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of
the j ury.)
THE COURT:

I'll reserve a ruling on 3.

Let's

move forward.
Q

(BY MR. BLACKNER)

Pending the ruling I'll just

move on to a different subject matter.

Yesterday we

talked to some extent about the Doral contract, which is
Exhibit 1.

Do you recall doing that, Mr. Ferrin?
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 2 6 ,
P A R T I A L

T R I A L

1 9 3 ; P.M.

SESSION

P R O C E E D I N G S

(The following record was reported by me,
Suzanne Warnick, a substitute reporter, in the absence of
the on-going reporter in order to handle a motion outside
the presence of the jury during the noontime recess.)
THE COURT:

We are on the record in the matter

of Ferrin v. Romney, that's Case No. 894902584 —

and I'll

indicate for the record, I think I just read the wrong
number into the file.

I'll correct that in a moment.

What I will indicate is that counsel is present,
the jury is out at the moment, and there are two issues
that counsel wanted to discuss with the Court in the
absence of the jury.

And the correct number on this I

will read into the record in a moment.
You may proceed, counsel.
MR. BLACKNER:

The purpose for which we are

having this on the record is whether or not there will be
allowed into evidence two documents relating to the
proposed buyout of KRA by Mr. Ferrin.
THE COURT:

Your position as to relevancy is

what, counsel?
MR. BLACKNER:

Our position is that these

key relevant documents.
THE COURT:

How are they relevant?
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MR. BLACKNER:

They are relevant because both of

them refer to compensation.

If I can quote you the direct

language in each of them, in the first document, the
document dated February 18, 1989, in paragraph 7, the last
sentence of that paragraph says,
"If KBR leaves KRA on his own or is terminated,
the above mentioned 25 percent payment shall
cease."
We believe that's relevant because it shows —
remember the plaintiff is alleging that he is entitled to
money after he leaves, although he has no written
agreement.

And even Mr. Romney —

Romney discussed it.

he didn't even say Mr.

This shows what was the attitude of

the parties, and certainly the plaintiff, with respect to,
if not their own agreement, evidence of certainly what he
felt was reasonable if someone leaves, he wasn't going to
pay them, continue to pay them.
THE COURT:

When you say what he thought was

relevant, who are you talking about?
MR. BLACKNER: I am referring to the plaintiff,
Mr. Ferrin.
THE COURT:

All right.

And I understand, Mr.

Smith, that you still are opposed to the introduction of
this Exhibit; is that correct?
MR. SMITH:

That is correct, your Honor.

nrxutTmrn-n-n -r r

I want
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the record to reflect that, though it was listed as a
proposed exhibit on our part because there are parts of it
that can be used for exactly the opposite conclusion, I
concluded that it was obviously an irrelevant document.
It was essentially a different set of facts, different
purposes for the issue to be resolved there.

What they do

in one circumstance has no bearing on what they would do
in another circumstance.
THE COURT:
forward, it seems.

What I would suggest is, move

Arguably it might be relevant to the

issue of compensation.

I am not willing to make a ruling

prior to any specific questions being asked.
In looking at it, there do appear to be certain
portions that may need to be redacted that are not
relevant to this case, even if the totality of it appears
relevant.

So we711 proceed on a question by answer basis.

I am not ruling on its admissibility at this point.

But I

am going to allow you to start to get into the area and
we711 see where we go with it.
With that in mind, is there anything further
before we bring in the jury?
MR. BLACKNER:

Would you like to address the

second document now, too?
MR. SMITH:

What second document?

THE COURT:

What second document?

nrwjmTirrvciTiTrrTPTi
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MR. BLACKNER:

There are two buyout agreements.

2

One is dated February 18, 1989.

3

THE COURT:

Where would that be, counsel?

4

have one that says March 1 of '89.

5

MR. BLACKNER:

6

I

This again was listed by both

parties.

7

THE COURT:

8

Where would it be in my packet of

Exhibits?

9

MR. BLACKNER:

I have a copy of it here for you.

10

MR. SMITH:

11

It's No. 9 in the Tab No. 9.

12

THE COURT:

So you don't have any objection to

14

MR. SMITH:

No.

15

do not intend to use it myself.

13

Is it this, No. 9?

this one?

16

It isn't a matter —

17

back around to it —

18

it being relevant.

19

different subject matter.

20

I

Let me state that again.

and I don't mean to come

but it is not a matter of portions of
This is negotiations on an entirely
It's like saying, Well, Gee, he

I went one day and bought a car and said, We'll defer

21
22

I have the same objection.

payments.
I

And therefore, that's relevant to this issue.
He went to try and buy Mr. Romney's business.

23

It had nothing whatsoever to do with his employment with

24

Keith Romney.

25

sold a house in this same time frame and we talked about

Why don't we bring in his —

POMPTTTFRTZED TRANSCRIPT

maybe he has

oo

deferred payments; maybe he bought a car, maybe he did a
dozen things,
THE COURT:

All right.

I understand your

position.
Mr. Blackner, tell me specifically what in this
agreement goes to issues before us in this case.
MR. BLACKNER:

Okay.

Now, to the extent Mr.

Smith's arguments have merit with respect to the first
document we have talked about, they clearly don't with
respect to this one.
THE COURT:

My question of you is simple.

What

is relevant in this agreement that you have now handed me?
MR. BLACKNER:
document.

Look on the last page of the

You'll see that just the page prior there is a

heading, Purchase Option and Employment Agreement.

Then

you'll see on the last page there is an entry,
"KBR and BAF agree to the following reemployment
agreement of BAF:
is terminated.

One, until BAF purchases, KRA

KBR agrees to pay BAF an amount

of 25 percent income received by d/b/a less
unreimbursed business consultation expenses (the
same method of determined used to date)."

that —

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, Mr. Blackner v,9ll knows

he took the deposition of Mr. Ferrin, anc Mr.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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Ferrin indicated at that time that this wasn't even in our
document list.
MR. BRENT FERRIN:

This wasn't even his

document.
MR. SMITH:

He didn't draft this document.

This

is a part of a negotiation.
MR. BRENT FERRIN:
THE COURT:

No, no, no.

Just a moment.

This one.

Let me ask this:

Who allegedly prepared this document?
MR. BLACKNER: That's been covered in the
deposition.
THE COURT:

I am asking, counsel, who allegedly

prepared this document?
MR. BLACKNER:

This document was prepared by Mr.

Ferrin's attorney with his input.

His attorney didn't

know what the agreement had been to date.

Someone had to

tell him.
THE COURT:

What attorney?

MR. SMITH:

Yeah.

I believe— I guess I am

going to have to go out and get the deposition testimony,
but this is what I recall, your Honor.

Mr. Ferrin said

this was a draft of a document that had been prepared by
his lawyer.
by anyone.

He never accepted it.

It was never approved

He did not approve of that language, had told

his lawyer to change that language.

It just never got

88

done because the negotiations stopped between them.
This was an attempt by Mr. Romney and Mr. Ferrin
to renegotiate their entire deal.

It never went through,

and this isn't Mr. Ferrin's language; this is a lawyer.
That was a draft proposal that was never used for any
purpose whatsoever.
THE COURT:

Mr. Blackner, anything further on

this point?
MR. BLACKNER:
representation.

I completely disagree with that

I covered this in the deposition.

I

asked him, Did you prepare this with your attorney?
you provide the input?

And the answer was, Yes.

submit this to Mr. Romney?
THE COURT:

agreement.

Did you

Yes.

How is it relevant?

MR. BLACKNER:
THE COURT:

Did

It's key.

We are not talking about this

We are not talking about an anticipated

agreement that may or may not have been entered by the
parties.

We are talking about a specific compensation

agreement that is not covered in this document.
MR. BLACKNER: Okay.
value.

I'll accept that at face

But in that one parenthetical expression, "(the

same method of determination used to date)," that's an
expression of what the agreement was.

That's key

evidence.

COMPUTET7FH
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THE COURT:

All right.

My ruling at this point

is that you may ask the witness whether his understanding
of compensation was consistent with this agreement that
was never entered into if you wish to.

The agreement,

itself, I perceive to be irrelevant and I am not going to
allow its use as an exhibit at this point, absent further
showing of relevancy.
You can certainly ask him if there is anything
in this now that he is familiar with the same that changes
his understanding, and he can answer whatever the reality
is.
Let's bring the jury in.
(This concludes the record made at this time
outside the presence of the jury.

The proceedings were

continued, as per the record of the regular reporter.)
***

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRTPT

103

57.

Can you identify that document for us, please?
A

Yes.

Q

Could you please tell us what it is?

A

It's handwritten notes of an outline to buy out

Keith Romney Associates by me.
Q

Is this a document that you created?

A

Yes.

Q

Is that your handwriting?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

Did you create it on or about the date

indicated, February 18th, 1989?
A

I don't know.

The date at the top appears to

be a little out of place, but apparently it could be
February 18th,

'89.

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, may we approach?

I'm

confused about something.
THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of
the jury.)
THE COURT:
Q

Next question, please, Mr. Blackner.

(BY MR. BLACKNER)

Mr. Ferrin, did you make a

buyout offer to KRA in February of
MR. SMITH:

'89?

Your Honor, objection.

It's

irrelevant.
MR. BLACKNER:

I'm not referring to the exnibit.

r*r\Mrr>TimT?'n-rr7'E*T\
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MR. SMITH:

But the subject matter of the

document has been deemed irrelevant, unless he's going to
use it for some sort of impeachment purposes, and that's
not the way to do it.
THE COURT:
Q

The objection is sustained.

(BY MR. BLACKNER)

Mr. Ferrin, in connection

with an offer you made to buy out KRA, did you make it a
part of that offer that if Mr. Romney were to leave—
MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, I'm going to have to

interrupt, because it's simply irrelevant.

It's not

information that has anything to do with this, and he's
going to get it before the jury by stating the answer in
the question.
THE COURT:
irrelevant, counsel.

All right, the buyout agreement is
The objection is sustained.

MR. BLACKNER:
THE COURT:

Is that—

That's my ruling, Mr. Blackner.

It's consistent with my ruling earlier on the record.
Let's move along.
MR. BLACKNER:

Your Honor, may we approach?

THE COURT:

Next question, please.

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, I know this is a little

out of order, but I see that the witness has been handed
another document which the court has already ruled is
irrelevant to these issues.

It talks about the buyout

COMPUTERIZED TRANSPPTPT
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Exhibit "c"

AGREEMENT
Agreement made this
day of February, 1990 between
Keith B. Romney of 1146 Gilmer Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah herein
referred to as seller and Brent A. Ferrin of 126 West Bayview
Drive, Farmington, Utah herein referred to as buyer.
The parties recite and declare:
1.
Seller now owns and conducts a business under the firm name
of Keith Romney Associates at 134 South Main, Salt-Lake City, Utah.
2.
Seller desires to sell and buyer desires to buy such business
for the price and on the terms and conditions hereinafter set
forth.
For the reasons set forth above and in consideration of the
mutual covenants and promises of the parties hereto, seller and
buyer covenant and agree:
SECTION ONE
SALE OF BUSINESS
Seller shall sell to buyer, free from all liabilities and
encumbrances, seller's above described business and all other
assets thereof as hereafter listed and as more specifically set
forth and enumerated in the schedule annexed hereto, entitled
Exhibit A, and made a part hereof by this reference as though fully
set forth.
SECTION TWO
CONSIDERATION
In consideration for the transfer of the above described
business from seller to buyer, buyer shall pay to seller the sum
of one million dollars ($1,000,000) , which seller shall accept
from buyer in full payment therefor, subject to the terms and
conditions herein contained.
SECTION THREE
ALLOCATION OF PURCHASE PRICE
The purchase price of one million dollars ($1,000,000) shall
be allocated to the various assets of the business as follows:

(a)

Equipment, furniture, and fixtures: $10,000

(b)

Good will: $10,000

(c)

Notes and accounts receivable: $250,000

(d)

Consulting services: $730,000

1
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SECTION FOUR
TIME AND MANNER OF PAYMENT
Date of closing will be thirty (30) days after gross income
of the business reach $750,000 for any calendar year, or any time
thereafter at the sole option of buyer.
The purchase price shall be paid as follows:
(a) A down payment of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in cash
upon the closing date of this agreement,
(b) Consulting fees of $150,000 per year payable in monthly
installments on the fifteenth day of each month, commencing thirty
days after the closing date referred to herein or an annual amount
equal to thirty percent (30%) of the gross income of the business,
whichever is greater, until the entire balance is paid in full.
Such payments shall apply only if annual gross receipts of the
business shall amount to $500,000 or more. If in any year there
shall be less than enough gross, income so that 30% would not
discharge these obligations then seller shall receive 50% of gross
profits.
SECTION FIVE
SELLER CONSULTING RESPONSIBILITIES
Seller agrees that he will dedicate his full time and effort
as a consultant to the business for at least 5 years from the date
of closing. After the initial 5 year period, buyer, at his sole
discretion, may elect to retain seller's services on a mutually
agreeable consulting fee basis thereafter.
SECTION SIX
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE
Seller shall not participate in any way, directly or
indirectly, in a business similar to that herein sold to buyer for
a term of ten (10) years from the date of closing.
SECTION SEVEN
DEATH OF SELLER
Upon the death of the seller, any and all payments or
obligations due seller under this agreement shall cease. Any
claims by heirs or representatives of seller's estate shall be
fully satisfied upon payment of $1 by the buyer to the estate of
the seller. Said payment shall be made within thirty (30) days
following the death of the seller.
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SECTION FOURTEEN
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
In case of claim of breach of contract by either party, the
party so claiming shall notify the other party in writing,
indicating the alleged breach and the amount of damages claimed
therefor. In case of dispute as to the existence of a breach, or
the amount of damages therefor, the parties shall submit the
dispute to a mutually acceptable three member board composed of
active arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association located
in the state of Utah. The decision of the arbitration board shall
be final where unanimous, but either dissatisfied with decision of
the arbitration board which is less than final shall have customary
recourse to the judicial system of the State of Utah. Where
damages for a claimed breach shall be assented to, or confirmed by
a unanimous determination of the arbitration board, such damages
shall be paid solely from the income generated by operation of the
business.
SECTION FIFTEEN
BINDING EFFECT
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, personal
representatives, and assigns of the parties hereto.
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this agreement
at Salt Lake City, Utah the day and year first above written.

Keith B. Romney

Brent: A. Ferrin

^0270

Purchase Option And Employment Agreement
Keith B. Romney (KBR) and Brent A. Ferrin (BAF) agree to
the following re:
Purchase Option of Keith Romney
Associates (KRA):
1.
Purchase price shall be determined by taking the
gross income of KRA from monthly incremental payments
received by KRA during the period from February 1, 1990
to February 28, 1990 times twelve (12). (ie. if ten
clients pay monthly incrementals of $10,000.00 each for
a total of $100,000.00 during the month of February then
the purchase price shall be $1,200,000.00 or 100000 X
12.)
2. If KBR shall receive a bonafide and verifiable offer
to purchase KRA before March 1, 1990 then BAF shall have
the option to match the offered price or in other words
first right of refusal.
3. If BAF decides that for whatever reason he is unable
to purchase KRA on March 1, 1990 then he shall have
additional options which may be exercised every six
months thereafter for a period of two years * or four
blocks of six months each at a price of twelve (12)
times the previous six months average
of monthly
incremental payments received by KRA.
4.
BAF agrees that at the time of consummated purchase
he will commit to pay KBR monthly payments on the first
day of each month for a period of five (5) years an
amount to fully amortize said purchase price at an
interest rate of ten (10) percent or to pay cash for the
remaining balance at any time with
no prepayment
penalty.
5.
KBR agrees to work full-time for KRA during the pay
out period at the request and sole discretion of BAF.
6.
KBR agrees that before a purchase of KRA is
consummated he will upgrade KRA in the following manner:
a)
Hire sufficient qualified professional and
staff personnel to service the needs of KRA's
clients.
b)
Obtain adequate computer hardware and software,
which shall include at least two PCs with a letter
quality printer and word perfect 5.0 software.
c) Negotiate and qualify for a reasonable long-term
lease in prestigious office space.
d) Acquire a copy machine and a fax machine for
office use.

e) Produce and print a reasonable amount of quality
brochures on KRA and its accomplishments.
f) Obtain an American Express corporate credit
card.

KBR and BAF agree
Agreement of BAF:

to

the

following

re: Employment

1. Until BAF purchases KRA or is terminated, KBR agrees
to pay BAF an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%)
of all income received by KRA less any unreimbursed
business cultivation
expenses (the same method of
determination used to date*).
2. BAF will be an independent contractor, and as such
shall be responsible for all personal income taxes,
parking fees, health insurance expenses, etc.
3. KBR agrees to reimburse BAF for all required company
travel and attendant expenses,
which are documented,
within 15 days from date of submission.

Keith B.Romney

Brent A. Ferrin

date

00272
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DUANE R. SMITH (2996)
CRAIG G. ADAMSON (0024)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-63 8 3
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
BRENT A. FERRIN,

:

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

:

v.

:

Civil No. 910900418

KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
ASSOCIATES,

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.

:
:
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DUANE R. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
states:
1.

That he

is counsel

for Plaintiff

in the above-

referenced action.
2.

That Plaintiff was the prevailing party at trial

having received a judgment in the sum of $102,681.42, together with
interests and costs.
3.

That

the

following

costs

were

reasonably

and

necessarily incurred in connection with the bringing prosecution
of the above-entitled action:

no0703

Filing Fee:
Service of Process Fee:
Cost of Deposition of
Plaintiff:
Travel Expenses of
Jim Vernes and
Bruce Mclntire:

/y/

125.00
4.50

$

501.40

$1,142.95
$1,773.85

TOTAL
DATED this

$
$

day of February/ 1993.

JANE R. SMH?H
Attorney for Plaintiff
~r<Jr. SUBSCRIBED
^anikucy, 1993.

AND

SWORN

TO

before

me

this

/&jf

day

of

My Commission Expires:
•t

" J'/

» r — - -n - ,CJ j

)TARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum

of Costs was served

on the

following

individual by

placing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid, this
/^f

day of February, 1993.

David L. Blackner
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

0007^3
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David L. Blackner, No. 5376
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID L. BLACKNER
Attorney for Defendant
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:

(801)521-3480

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRENT A. FERRIN,
Plaintiff ,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO HAVE
COSTS TAXED BY THE COURT

vs.
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
ASSOCIATES,

Civil No.
Judge:

910900418

Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.

Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), defendant and counterclaim
plaintiff Keith B. Romney objects to the memorandum of costs (the
"Memorandum") submitted by plaintiff and counterclaim defendant
Brent A. Ferrin ("Ferrin") in this matter and respectfully moves
the Court to tax only those costs allowed under Utah law.
DATED this

¥V

day of February, 1993.

1

X

fcptsUsS*
David L. Blackner

f ^

£2~^~^z_

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
In his memorandum of costs, Ferrin has claimed as "costs"
certain expenses incurred in the course of this litigation which
are not properly taxable as "costs" under Utah law.

The Utah

Supreme Court has defined "costs" to mean only:
"those fees which are required to be paid to the
court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes
authorize to be included in the judgment.
There is a
distinction to be understood between the legitimate and
taxable 'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation which
may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable
as costs." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1980).
Although a trial court is allowed to exercise reasonable discretion
in regard to the allowance of costs, the court still "has a duty
to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof."
Frampton, supra, at pp. 773-774.
Construing this holding, the Court of Appeals has held
that

"witness

fees,

travel

expenses,

and

service

of

process

expenses are chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule
set by statute."
App. 1990).

Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct.

In addition, the Court of Appeals has fur her stated

that the "[c]osts of depositions also are not recoverat * unless
'the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in gi d raith
and, in light of the circumstances, appeared to be esse; ial for
the development and presentation of the case."

Morgan, supra, at

-2-

t\

r. ^ 1 1

p. 687; Ames v. Maas, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 51 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

The Court of Appeals has specifically disallowed as "costs"

appraisal

fees, copying costs, word processing charges, courier

charges, local travel expenses, litigation support, and business
meals.

Morgan, supra, at p. 687.
In the memorandum of costs filed with the Court, Ferrin

seeks reimbursement of the following costs:
Filing Fee:
Service of Process Fee:
Cost of Deposition of
Plaintiff:
Travel Expenses of
Jim Vernes and

$125.00
$4.50
$501.40

Bruce Mclntire:

$1,142.95

TOTAL:

$1,773.85

Romney has no quarrel with either the filing fee of $125 or the
service of process fee of $4.50.
with

the "deposition

He does, however, have a problem

of plaintiff" and

the unspecified

"travel

expenses" of Mr. Vernes and Mr. Mclntire, each of whom appeared
voluntarily for Ferrin and traveled from outside the state.
First, with respect to the "deposition

of plaintiff,"

Ferrin is. the plaintiff and did not schedule and take his own
deposition in this matter, he took Romney 1 s deposition.

Romney

scheduled and has already paid for plaintifffs deposition.

Perhaps

Ferrin intended to indicate "deposition of defendant" and this cost
entry is a typographical error.

However, the rather high cost of

$501.40 suggests that Ferrin does mean the [copy] cost of his own
deposition

since

Ferrin's

Romney 1 s

whereas

deposition

deposition

was

took place

completed

over

two

in one day.

days

Romney

objects to being asked to pay twice for plaintiff's deposition and
for

that

reason

requests

that

the

Court

disallow

the

$501.40

claimed by Ferrin.
Romney also objects to the unspecified "travel expenses"
for Mr. Vernes and Mr. Mclntire, both of whom appeared voluntarily
on behalf of Ferrin.

Romney has no idea what the claimed $1,142.95

figure is comprised of.

Regardless of what the figure includes,

however, the statutes are very specific on what an out of state
witness in a civil case in Utah is entitled to receive.

Utah Code

Ann. 21-5-4(2) specifically provides as follows:
A witness attending from outside the state in a civil
case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents per mile and
is taxed for the distance actually and necessarily traveled
inside the state in going only.
Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2)
(Supp. 1992).
Out of state witnesses are not entitled by statute to airfare,
hotel charges, meals, taxi cab fares, or whatever else the claimed
$1,142.95 may actually be comprised of.
pay

these

amounts

for

Mr.

Vernes

and

Ferrin may have agreed to
Mr. Mclntire,

expenses are not taxable as "costs" under Utah law.
above,

"witness

fees, travel

expenses, and

service

but

such

As set forth
of

process

expenses are chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule

set by statute."

Morgan, supra, at pp. 686-687.

Accordingly,

Romney urges the Court to also disallow the $1,142.95 claimed by
Ferrin for unspecified "travel expenses."

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1993

tOt^/Z^^y^
David L. Blackner
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

~T

day of February, 1993, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO HAVE COSTS TAXED BY COURT by first class mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Duane R. Smith
Craig G. Adamson
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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DUANE R. SMITH (2996)
CRAIG G. ADAMSON (0024)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-63 83
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
BRENT A. FERRIN,

:

Plaintiff,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

:

v.

:

Civil No. 910900418

KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY &
ASSOCIATES,

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.

:
:
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DUANE R. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
states:
1.

That he

is counsel

for Plaintiff

in the above-

referenced action.
2.

That Plaintiff was the prevailing party at trial

having received a judgment in the sum of $102,681.42, together with
interests and costs.
3.
necessarily

That
incurred

the
in

following

costs

connection

with

were
the

reasonably

and

bringing

and

prosecution of the above-entitled action:
f\nn^1 Z

Filing Fee:
Service of Process Fee:
Cost of Deposition of
Defendant:
Travel Expenses of
Jim Vernes and
Bruce Maclntire:

Defendant

125,.00
4..50

$

501..40

$1,,142.,95

TOTAL
4.

$
$

$1,773,85

That the fee of $501.40 for the deposition of the

is that which was

actually

incurred,

a copy

of

the

Statement of the Reporter is attached.
5.

That the witness expenses were actually paid and are

comprised of the following:

Lodging:
Taxi:
Transportation:
Food:

$591.88 (Jim Vernes Vancouver BC SLC return)
$ 77.50 (Jim Vernes)
$ 26.00 (Jim Vernes)
$248.00 (Bruce Maclntire)
$150.57

Total:

$1,142,95

Airfare:

DATED this

//

day of Februar

SANE R.

sMlTif

Attorney for Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED
February, 1993.

AND

SWORN

TO

before

me

this

day

My Commission Expires:
)TARY

• *%• «39 *rm mm *ai L » KM torn mm tarn a
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum

of Costs was served

on the following

individual by

placing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid, this
JV^

day of February, 1993.

David L. Blackner
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

000713

DEPENDENT Ru ORTING SERVICE
•bell Garcia
i M . Calder

0 Beneficial Life Tower
South State Street
Lake City. Utah 84111
1)538-2333

RECEIVED
M

9 1992

April 13. 1992

TO:

r^Duane E. Smltn
Attorney at Lav
310 Soutn Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utan 84101

L
Invoiced 1082RCG

:

FEHRIM V8. ROMNEY
Civil HO. 910900418

position Of: KEITH B. ROMNEY
fcen: Karen 3. 1992
lslnal 4 1 - 156 pp
tnblt - 7 pp
r Diem:

$390.00
1.40
110.00

tal:

$501.40

)oner:

Rashell Garcia

1.0. #87-0430073

•••••THANK YOU"*****

' \A/~
. / *..v. r ,C,-«- f *-

[\Zl
L_AW O F F I C E S

OF

DAVID L. BLACKNER

r r o 0 3 1993

KEARNS BUILDING MEZZANINE
134 SOUTH MAIN STREET

l U D

'JUL

S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 X"*t
TELEPHONE (801 ) 521 -348CV,, ^
FAX (801 ) 5 2 4 - 0 2 1 0

February 12, 1993

Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Brent A. Ferrin v. Keith B. Romney
Civil No. 910900418

Dear Judge Lewis:
Enclosed is a courtesy copy of Romney's Objection to Entry of
Proposed Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Have Costs Taxed by the
Court.
I have reviewed the changes made by Ferrinfs Amended
Memorandum of Costs and the explanation thereof in Mr. Smith's
letter to you of February 11, 1993. Based upon the changes made,
Romney has no objection to the cost entry of $501.40 for
"deposition of defendant," but reiterates his objection to any
claimed costs and travel expenses for Mr. Vernes or Mr. Maclntire.
Romney fs reasons for objecting to such costs are set out in his
Rule 54(d)(2) Motion.
Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.
Si^r^erely, .

•

^

.

^

David L. Blackner

DLB/db
cc: Duane R. Smith, Esq,
Keith B. Romney

>

,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
FERRIN, BRENT A
PLAINTIFF
VS
ROMNEY, KEITH B
DBA KEITH ROMNEY ASS DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 910900418 CN
DATE 02/23/93
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK EHM

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THE COURT RECEIVED AND REVIEWED PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT ON THE
VERDICT, AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE SAME.
THE COURT SIGNED THE JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT AS SUBMITTED
BY PLAINTIFF WITH CHANGES INTERLINEATED BY THE COURT, AND
AWARDING COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,773.85.

000723

Case No: 910900418 CN
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the

/

day of

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
DUANE R. SMITH
Atty for Plaintiff
310 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE 1330
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

DAVID L BLACKNER
Atty for Defendant
KEARNS BUILDING MEZZANINE
134 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
District Court Clerk
By

: fj\MfAMJ~M&thMK>
Deputy Clerk

